

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE 2333Z 07 JUN 63

T O P S E C R E T

ROUTING	
1	4
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OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	
IN 79085	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : [REDACTED] 25X1A

ACTION: OSA (1-15)

INFO : S/C (16)

25X1A

TOR: 0455Z 08 JUN 63

TO OPIM [REDACTED] INFO

CITE [REDACTED] 9810

OX CART

REF [REDACTED] 8399

REFERENCE PART TWO OF REF. THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSCRIPT OF [REDACTED] STATEMENT TO THE ACCIDENT BOARD:

THIS IS EXTRACT OF TAPED INTERVIEW DISCUSSING IN DETAIL THE STATEMENT SIGNED BY [REDACTED] 25 MAY 63. INTERVIEW CONDUCTED BY MEMBERS OF COORDINATION GROUP. EACH SENTENCE WAS DISCUSSED INDIVIDUALLY TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

[REDACTED] KEN, WHAT I AM GOING TO DO IS TAKE YOUR WRITTEN STATEMENT AND TRY TO ADD ESSENTIAL PIECES OF INFORMATION THAT WILL HELP GUIDE THESE PEOPLE ON WHAT TO LOOK FOR. LET ME GIVE YOU A COPY, I THINK WE SHOULD GO THRU SENTENCE BY SENTENCE. JUST BEFORE YOU GOT HERE WE WENT THRU THIS SAME STATEMENT KEN AND HAD THIS GROUP OF PEOPLE HERE AND SAID TO THEM, "NOW, AS WE TAKE THIS STATEMENT SENTENCE BY SENTENCE WHAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DO YOU NEED TO DO YOUR JOB?"

THIS IS WHAT WE HOPE TO DO HERE, OK LET ME TAKE THE FIRST SENTENCE THEN, I'D LIKE TO TAKE THIS SENTENCE, KEN AND ASK YOU THE LIST

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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OF QUESTIONS HERE. THERE ARE MANY ON PRACTICALLY EVERY SENTENCE. FIRST SENTENCE; "PRIOR TO REACHING THE WENDOVER CHECKPOINT, I WAS AT 34,000 FEET INDICATING POINT EIGHT FIVE MACH ON THE TRIPLE DISPLAY INDICATOR". THE FIRST QUESTION THAT WAS ASKED WAS, DO YOU RECALL UP TO THAT POINT WHAT YOUR FUEL FLOW RPM AND EGT HAD BEEN?

KEN: YES, DURING THE ENTIRE FLIGHT THE RPM WAS VERY NEAR 97 OR 98 PERCENT. THE FUEL FLOW, I BELIEVE, WAS RIGHT AROUND 530 OR 540 RIGHT IN THERE.

THIS IS FUEL FLOW WAS IT?

KEN: NO, EGT.

EGT, I'M SORRY.

KEN: AND THE FUEL FLOW IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT WAS AROUND 8100, BUT I AM NOT POSITIVE OF THIS, I BELIEVE I CHECKED ON MY RPM BECAUSE I WAS CHECKING MY ALTITUDE AND SPEED. I WASN'T REALLY NOTICING THE FUEL FLOW AND EGT, AS MUCH AS I WAS ALTITUDE AND SPEED FOR THE INS, AND SO FORTH.

YOU MEAN THE TOTAL FUEL FLOW, 8100/HOUR?

KEN: YES

WERE THEY PRETTY WELL DIVIDED BETWEEN THE TWO ENGINES?

KEN: THEY WERE 4,000 EACH, AGAIN I DIDN'T TAKE ANY PARTICULAR NOTE BECAUSE EVERYTHING SEEMED TO BE RUNNING NORMAL AT THIS TIME OF THE FLIGHT, AND THE DURATION UP TO THAT TIME HAD BEEN APPROX TWO HOURS, I'D MADE THE ROUTE BEFORE, AND WAS REPEATING THE SAME ROUTE.

MY QUESTION NEXT ON THIS SAME, KEN, YOU MENTIONED TRIPLE DISPLAY INDICATOR. HAD YOU BEEN CROSS CHECKING TRIPLE DISPLAY WITH YOUR INDICATED AIR SPEED?

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25X1A KEN: NO.

OK NEXT SENTENCE. UPON READING ZERO ON THE "DISTANCE TO GO" INDICATOR, INS, I BEGAN A LEFT TURN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRE-BRIEF FLITE PLAN. THE FIRST QUESTION ON THIS WAS, "WHAT MODE WERE YOU ON IN THE TURN, DID YOU USE THE TURN KNOB OR CSC (CONTROL STICK COMMAND)"?

25X1A KEN: CSC.

CSC. DO YOU RECALL YOUR ANGLE OF BANK IN THIS TURN?

25X1A KEN: IT DIDN'T EXCEED 30 DEGREES.

OK, WERE YOU IN THE CLEAR AT THIS TIME, WERE YOU ON TOP OF THE CLOUDS?

25X1A KEN: BEGINNING THE TURN, I WAS IN THE CLEAR. YES I WAS VFR.

NEXT SENTENCE. "AT APPROXIMATELY HALF WAY THRU THE LEFT TURN, I NOTICED THE MACH DIAL INCREASING". WERE YOU ON MACH HOLD AT THIS TIME?

25X1A KEN: NO, THE MACH HOLD WE DON'T USE. MAINLY IT WAS, I BELIEVE, MALFUNCTIONING AND WE DIDN'T USE IT. I DIDN'T USE THE MACH HOLD AT ALL DURING ANY PORTION OF THE FLIGHT. I WAS ON CSC AS FAR AS THE CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT JUST AS I HAD STARTED INTO THE TURN.

WAS THE MACH HOLD WRITTEN UP ON THE AIRCRAFT AS IN-OPERATIVE? HOW DID YOU KNOW THIS?

25X1A KEN: THIS FLIGHT; I DON'T KNOW, WE JUST HAVEN'T BEEN USING THE MACH HOLD. I REMEMBER I CHECKED IT ONE TIME AND WE GOT SOME PORPOISE OUT OF IT AND WE HAD NOT BEEN USING IT. I'M NOT SURE IF IT HAD BEEN WRITTEN UP ON THIS PARTICULAR FLIGHT OR NOT. BUT, THE ONLY THING I USED WAS AUTO-NAV AND CSC. THE AUTOPILOT WAS ENGAGED IN PITCH AND ROLL,

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PILOT.

25X1A [REDACTED] WELL, HAD YOU BEEN CONTROLLING PITCH WITH PITCH KNOB?

KEN: ON THE STRAIGHT AND LEVEL FLIGHT I HAD BEEN CONTROLLING IT AND CHECKING IT AND USING VERY MINUTE CHANGES IN PITCH CONTROL WHEEL. WHAT DO I WANT TO SAY, CHANGES IN THE WHEEL, THE PITCH TRIM WHEEL, YES, BECAUSE I WAS ATTEMPTING TO KEEP THE VERTICAL SPEED AND ALTITUDE RIGHT ON WITH VERY MINIMUM TRIM.

25X1A [REDACTED] OK. KEN AT THIS TIME YOU MENTIONED THE MACH DIAL INCREASING, WAS KEAS INCREASING ALSO AT THIS TIME?

KEN: YES, IT WAS. HOWEVER I THINK THE THING THAT CAUGHT MY EYE SO MUCH WAS THAT THE MACH WAS INCREASING AND SEEMED TO BE INCREASING VERY RAPIDLY. OF COURSE I'M SURE THE AIR SPEED, THE KEAS, WAS GOING UP, BUT I JUST WATCHED THAT AND WHEN I SAW IT, OF COURSE, GO UP TO 1.05, THIS IS THE THING THAT REGISTERED IN MY MIND, ONE, POINT, ZERO FIVE ON THE MACH TRIPLE DISPLAY.

25X1A [REDACTED] ALL RIGHT, LET ME GO TO THE NEXT SENTENCE. I BEGAN A CLIMB WHILE IN THE TURN, HOWEVER, THE AIR SPEED AND MACH NUMBER CONTINUED TO INCREASE, DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT YOUR RATE OF CLIMB WAS, DID YOU CHECK THAT?

KEN: NO, I DON'T RECALL THE RATE OF CLIMB, IT WASN'T MUCH OF ANYTHING, I MEAN REALLY, I JUST HAD BEGUN A SLIGHT INCREASE IN THE CLIMB, MAINLY TO KEEP, JUST TO GET ABOVE, THE WEATHER THAT I SAW THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE GETTING INTO, AND ALSO TO TRY TO KEEP MY AIRSPEED AS CONSTANT AS POSSIBLE FOR THE CHASE. BECAUSE THE 101 CAN'T MAKE THE RATE OF CLIMB AND CHANGE OF AIRSPEEDS AS WE DO.

25X1A [REDACTED] DID YOU NOTICE A CHANGE ON YOUR TRIPLE DISPLAY INDICATOR ALTIMETER AT THIS TIME, IS THIS HOW YOU KNEW YOU WERE CLIMBING?

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KEN: YES, IT WAS CHANGING VERY SLOWLY, IT WAS INCREASING SLOWLY.

25X1A

[REDACTED] THEN, DID YOU CHECK THIS AGAINST YOUR NORMAL ALTIMETER, YOUR BACK-UP?

KEN: NO, I WAS CHECKING MY ATTITUDE INDICATOR WITH MY ALTIMETER ON THE TRIPLE DISPLAY, AND OF COURSE THIS WAS WHEN I WAS NOTICING THE CLIMB. PRACTICALLY THE ENTIRE FLIGHT IS FLOWN OFF THE TRIPLE DISPLAY INDICATOR BECAUSE THE NUMBERS ARE READ OUT ON IT AND IT IS MORE EASY TO READ.

25X1A

[REDACTED] ALRIGHT, YOU MENTIONED YOUR ATTITUDE INDICATOR, KEN, WAS THERE A NOTICEABLE PITCH CHANGE?

KEN: NO, JUST SLIGHT PITCH CHANGE AS I WAS INTENDED FOR THE AIRCRAFT TO BE IN.

25X1A

[REDACTED] DO YOU REMEMBER ROUGHLY HOW MANY DEGREES NOSE HIGH IT WAS INDICATING.

KEN: I WOULD SAY THAT THE DOT WAS ABOUT ONE DOT WIDTH ABOVE THE BAR.

[REDACTED] "THE MAXIMUM MACH WAS ONE POINT ZERO FIVE." THIS INDICATED KEN, TO YOU THAT YOU HAD GONE SUPERSONIC, DID YOU RECALL ANY STRUCTURAL BUFFETING OR ANY INDICATION THAT YOU HAD GONE THRU MACH ONE?

KEN: THIS INDICATED ONLY THAT IN THIS I DIDN'T BELIEVE AT THE TIME, I THOUGHT MAYBE WE WERE HAVING A MALFUNCTION AND MAYBE THE THING WAS, SOME TIMES LIKE THE TACAN WILL DO IF IT STARTS RUNNING OFF, AND I THOUGHT THIS THING WAS DOING THE SAME THING AT THAT TIME, SO I WASN'T TOO CONCERNED WITH IT; EVERYTHING ELSE WAS NORMAL.

[REDACTED] OK, IF YOU RECALL, KEN, WHEN THIS THING GOES SUPERSONIC THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE PITOT-STATIC INSTRUMENTS THAT IS SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO THE F101, ONLY NOT AS MUCH. YOU DO GET

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ABOUT A THOUSAND FOOT ALTITUDE JUMP IN THE ALTIMETER.

KEN: WELL, THE MACH INCREASED RATHER QUICKLY AND AS I THINK BACK, I DON'T KNOW IF I MENTIONED HERE, IT STARTED GOING BACK DOWN SOMEWHERE AT ABOUT THE TIME I WAS LEVELING OFF, SO DIDN'T PAY ANY ATTENTION. THEN I THOUGHT IT WAS JUST GOING TO SETTLE DOWN, AND THEN I THOUGHT THAT IT WAS A TRANSIENT ERROR OF SOME KIND.

OK, NEXT SENTENCE. "I COULD NOT FIGURE OUT WHY THIS COULD OCCUR SINCE THE THROTTLE SETTING HAD REMAINED CONSTANT THROUGHOUT THE FLIGHT AND I WAS CLIMBING". HERE AGAIN I HAD ASKED THE QUESTION FUEL FLOW AND RPM, THE SAME AS YOU PREVIOUSLY GAVE ME ROUGHLY 3100 AND 97 PERCENT.

KEN: I AM NOT POSITIVE OF THE FUEL FLOW AS FAR AS MAKING A DEFINITE STATEMENT ON IT. THE RPM, I KNOW REMAINED THE SAME.

YOU MENTIONED CLIMBING. HERE AGAIN, DID YOU NOTICE THE RATE OF CLIMB?

KEN: THE RATE OF CLIMB WAS ABOUT THE SAME, I DIDN'T INCREASE IT ANY. I JUST HAD A VERY MODERATE RATE OF CLIMB. IT WAS ABOUT THE SAME AS WE HAD MENTIONED EARLIER.

CAN YOU STATE APPROXIMATELY WHAT THIS WAS? IN HUNDREDS OF FEET PER MINUTE?

KEN: WELL AS I SAY, I WAS CHECKING THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR AND IT WAS JUST A DOT ABOVE THE BAR. THE TRIPLE DISPLAY INDICATOR, ALTITUDE INDICATOR, WAS INCREASING SLOWLY.

WHAT WAS THE HIGHEST ALTITUDE THAT YOU REACHED IN THIS SLOW CLIMB?

KEN: DURING THE CLIMB? YES, I BELIEVE I WAS VERY NEAR 38,000.

I WOULD SAY ABOUT 37,750. THAT WAS THE PEAK ALTITUDE DURING THIS CYCLE. THAT'S WHEN I LET

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I ROLLED OUT ON THE INS NEEDLE, THE NUMBER TWO NEEDLE. THEN AT THE TIME OF LEVELING OFF I WENT BACK INTO AUTO-NAV.

NOW JUST TO DEVIATE A LITTLE, KEN, ON TYPE OF INFORMATION, AT ANY TIME DURING THIS TURN AND WHILE YOU WERE CLIMBING, DID YOU HAVE THE FEELING THAT YOU WERE HAVING TROUBLE BREATHING OR THAT YOU MIGHT NOT BE GETTING SUFFICIENT OXYGEN?

KEN: NO, SIR.

NO SENSATION OF THAT AT ALL?

KEN: NONE AT ALL.

DID YOU AT THIS STAGE OF THE FLIGHT EVER CHECK OXYGEN SUPPLY OR LOW PRESSURE INDICATIONS ON YOUR CONSOLE OR CHECK THAT YOUR OXYGEN WAS FLOWING NORMALLY.

KEN: I HAD TURNED ON THE NUMBER TWO OXYGEN SYSTEM ON THE GROUND. I HAD NOT TURNED THE NUMBER ONE ON PRIOR TO TAKEOFF. I DID SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE FIRST LEG AND I, AFTER CHECKING OXYGEN AGAIN, TURNED THE NUMBER ONE ON PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE NUMBER TWO SYSTEM USUALLY STAYS UP HIGHER AND IT JUST STICKS OR STAYS THERE. WE DON'T USE IT AND WE USE THE NUMBER ONE, SO I TURNED THE NUMBER ONE ON, AND THEY WERE BOTH READING OUT, THE NUMBER TWO BEING SLIGHTLY BELOW THE NUMBER ONE. AS FAR AS THE BREATHING AND THE PRESSURE, THOSE GAUGES WERE WORKING NORMALLY.

OK. "WHILE IN THE TURN MY WINGMAN, SAID THAT HE COULD NOT KEEP THE SAME RATE OF TURN, THEREFORE MAKING A LARGER TURN." KEN, HAD JACK HAD ANY TROUBLE ON ANY OF THE PREVIOUS TURNS. HAD HE MENTIONED HAVING ANY PROBLEMS?

KEN: NO HE DIDN'T. WELL, HE JUST COULDN'T MAKE THE SAME RADIUS OF TURN AND I ASSUMED THAT AIR SPEED AND MY SPEED HAS SLOWED

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DOWN SOME BECAUSE OF THE CLIMB AS I MENTIONED THE REASON I

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DIDN'T MAKE SUCH A STEEP TURN IS BECAUSE OF THIS, AND THE 101'S INABILITY TO MAINTAIN THAT ATTITUDE. WE STARTED OUT AT 34,000, AND FOR THE 101 THIS IS ABOUT MAX FOR MAKING ANY MORE THAN A 20 DEGREE TURN.

[REDACTED] SO YOU HAD HIS TURNING CAPABILITY IN MIND?

KEN: YES SIR, BECAUSE IF I WAS TURNING 20 I'M SURE THAT HE WAS TURNING A LITTLE MORE THAN 20 DEGREE BANK, BUT NOT OVER 30.

[REDACTED] OK NEXT SENTENCE. "HE STILL HAD ME IN SIGHT."

WAS HE ABOVE YOU AT THAT TIME TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE?

KEN: I DON'T PERSONALLY KNOW BECAUSE I DIDN'T SEE HIM, BUT HE SAID HE HAD ME IN SIGHT AND I DIDN'T REALLY THINK ANYMORE ABOUT IT.

[REDACTED] OK. "DURING THIS TIME, I WAS FLYING THE AIRCRAFT WITH THE CSC STICK BUTTON". KEN DID YOU FEEL THAT WHEN YOU MASHED THE BUTTON FOR CSC THAT THE AUTO

PILOT WAS INDEED DISENGAGING AND THAT YOU WERE FLYING IT MANUALLY?

KEN: I MADE, AS I SAY, THIS WAS THE SECOND TIME AROUND THE COURSE, AND ALL OF MY TURNS WERE DONE ON CSC, AND I THOUGHT THAT IT WAS WORKING PROPERLY.

[REDACTED] DID YOU FEEL THAT YOU WERE DISENGAGING, MAKING THE MANUAL TURN, AND THEN REENGAGING THE CSC.

KEN: YES.

[REDACTED] "AFTER OBSERVING THE INCREASE IN THE MACH AND AIRSPEED OF THE TRIPLE DISPLAY INDICATOR I RETARDED THE THROTTLE SLIGHTLY TO SEE WHAT EFFECT THIS WOULD HAVE". DO YOU REMEMBER THE MAGNITUDE OF RETARDING KEN, WAS IT A LONG WAY BACK OR JUST A SLIGHT REDUCTION?

KEN: NO, IT WAS JUST THE, THIS GOES ALL THE WAY THRU THE ENTIRE FLIGHT BECAUSE OF THE THROTTLE AND THE RIGHT THROTTLE CREEPING BACK

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THE FRICTION KNOB ALL THE WAY UP AND IT WAS QUITE TIGHT. I CAME BACK AT THE MOST A HALF INCH.

DO YOU RECALL WHAT THE CHANGE IN FUEL FLOW WAS, OR RPM?

KEN: NO. I WAS WATCHING MY INDICATOR, MY INS NUMBER TWO NEEDLE, AND MY ATTITUDE INDICATOR AND MY TRIPLE DISPLAY. I DIDN'T CHECK.

DID PULLING THE THROTTLES BACK HAVE ANY IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON KEAS OR MACH?

KEN: NOT THAT I COULD TELL.

NEXT SENTENCE. "I THEN LEVELED OFF ON TOP OF THE CIRRUS AND ENGAGED THE AUTO-NAVIGATION POSITION TO THE INS". DO YOU RECALL THE ALTITUDE AT WHICH YOU LEVELED OFF?

KEN: I LEVELED OFF AT ABOUT 37,750. I WAS THINKING OF ABOUT 38,000 AND I DON'T KNOW ABOUT THAT.

IS THIS THE FIRST TIME THAT YOU GOT IN THE CIRRUS CLOUDS, OR HAD YOU BEEN IN THEM BEFORE?

KEN: WE HAD BEEN IN THE TOPS OF THEM. IT WAS JUST A THIN CIRRUS CONDITION THAT I HAD NO DIFFICULTY THRU MOST OR THE MAJORITY OF IT. EITHER IN THE WINGMAN SEEING ME OR ME SEEING THE WINGMAN. AT ONE TIME, WHERE WE WERE COMING IN TO CLOUDS HE DID MOVE IN A LITTLE CLOSER. I IMAGINE ITS BECAUSE HE KNEW I WAS GETTING INTO THICKER CLOUDS. THIS WAS PRIOR TO THE TURN HOWEVER. WE HAD BEEN IN AND OUT OF THE TOPS, OF THESE RAGGED TOPS, WHICH WAS CIRRUS. NO HORIZON.

WAS THERE ANY INDICATION KEN, DID YOU SEE ANY CUMULUS ACTIVITY?

KEN: YES, JUST THE VERY TOPS OF IT ON THE FIRST RUN FROM WENDOVER DOWN TO THE BASE HERE. I HAD GOTTEN INTO IT BECAUSE OF THE COURSE AND BECAUSE THE PACKAGE AND INS, AND THE NEEDLE WAS JUST ON THE HEADING

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IT WAS SUPPOSED TO FLY. I WENT THROUGH THE TOP OF ONE, AND [REDACTED] ASKED IF IT WAS A LITTLE ROUGH IN THERE. NO, I SAID, IT WASN'T TOO ROUGH IN THERE. I WAS NOTICING OR INTERESTED IN HOW THE STABILITY AUGMENTATION SYSTEM AND HOW THE HYDRAULIC GAGES WERE FUNCTIONING, AND THE INS. YOU GET A LITTLE SHIMMYING I THINK PRIMARY BECAUSE OF THE LENGTH OF THE FUSELAGE. BUT NOTHING UNUSUAL ABOUT IT.

[REDACTED] RIGHT AT THE TIME OF THIS TURN NOW THAT WE HAVE JUST BEEN THROUGH AT WENDOVER WAS THERE ANY CUMULUS ACTIVITY THERE AT THAT TIME?

KEN: NO.

[REDACTED] JUST CIRRUS?

KEN: YES SIR.

[REDACTED] YOU MENTIONED GOING INTO AUTO-NAV. DID YOU TURN THE AIRPLANE TO CENTER UP THE NUMBER TWO NEEDLE OR DID THE STEERING NEEDLE TAKE OVER, AND START YOU TURNING TOWARD COURSE.

KEN: YES, I ROLLED IT OUT MANUALLY AND I WAS PRACTICALLY RIGHT ON COURSE. THERE WAS MAYBE JUST THE SLIGHTEST DEGREE OF CORRECTION.

[REDACTED] "DURING THIS TIME THE AIRSPEED INDICATION BEGAN TO DECREASE". AT THIS TIME DO YOU REMEMBER, DID YOU CHECK THE TRIPLE DISPLAY, AGAINST INDICATED AIRSPEED, (IAS)?

KEN: NO.

[REDACTED] YOU DID NOT.

KEN: NO, IT WASN'T IMMEDIATE--, DURING THIS TIME, THIS THING ALL TOOK JUST A MATTER OF A FEW MINUTES, AND IT WAS JUST A MATTER OF GETTING ON THE COURSE, CHECKING IT. I NOTICED THAT THE THING DID START COMING DOWN AND OF COURSE THEN I WENT ON TO CHECK MY NEEDLE WHICH WAS ABOUT 200 DEGREES INTO THE STATION AND GOING

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25X1A OVER TO THE AUTO-NAV COURSE.

WHEN YOU NOTICED THE AIRSPEED BEGIN TO INCREASE
DID YOU CHECK THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR AT THIS TIME, DO YOU REMEMBER?

25X1A KEN: YES THE ATTITUDE AS I SAY, I WAS FLYING OFF THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR BECAUSE ACTUALLY THERE WAS NO HORIZON OTHER THAN THE CIRRUS THAT WE WERE GOING INTO, AND AS I REPEATED THERE WAS JUST SLIGHT CLIMB INDICATION.

25X1A NORMAL?

25X1A KEN: YES SIR.

OK. DID YOU HAPPEN TO NOTICE MACH NUMBER CHANGES OR ALTITUDE CHANGES ON THE TRIPLE DISPLAY COINCIDENT WITH THESE AIRSPEED CHANGES?

25X1A KEN: WELL THE ALTITUDE WAS INCREASING SLIGHTLY WITH MY CLIMB OF COURSE WHICH I DO RECALL.

OH, YOU WERE STILL CLIMBING AT THIS TIME?

25X1A KEN: OH, I AM SORRY, YOU MEAN AFTER LEVEL OFF?

YES.

25X1A KEN: NO, I DIDN'T CLIMB THEN.

WELL, RIGHT HERE WHERE IT SAYS DURING THIS TIME THE AIRSPEED INDICATION BEGAN TO DECREASE, YOU WERE LEVEL AT THIS TIME?

25X1A KEN: YES SIR. YES I AM SORRY, I MISUNDERSTOOD YOU. YES I WAS LEVEL.

DO YOU REMEMBER IF MACH WAS DECREASING AT THIS TIME?

25X1A KEN: YES BOTH MACH AND THE KEAS WAS DECREASING.

"ASSUMING THAT IT WAS A TEMPORARY MALFUNCTION I BEGAN CHECKING MY MISSION EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUMENTS". ENGINE INSTRUMENT- WISE DID YOU NOTICE FUEL FLOW AT THIS TIME KEN?

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25X1A KEN: NOT THAT I COULD SAY EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS. I LOOKED DOWN AT THE INSTRUMENTS AND CHECKED THEM OVER AND I ASSUME THAT THEY WERE ALL NORMAL OR I WOULD PROBABLY HAVE NOTICED IT.

[REDACTED] YOU DON'T REMEMBER SPECIFICALLY EGT OR LOW RPM?

25X1A KEN: NO SIR, I DO NOT.

[REDACTED] CHECKING MISSION EQUIPMENT. WHAT, JUST YOUR STEERING NEEDLE?

KEN: MY INS, MY AUTO-NAV, I WAS LOOKING AT THE INSTRUMENTS, THE AIRSPEED, AND OF COURSE FLYING OFF OF MY ATTITUDE INDICATOR, MY ALTITUDE, SEEING THAT IT STARTED TO GO DOWN, WHICH I ASSUMED ONCE IT HAS HIT IT'S PEAK IT STARTED DOWN.

25X1A I WENT OVER TO AUTO-NAV AFTER I HAD LEVELED OFF SO THAT I COULD CONTINUE ON WITH THE MISSION, OR THE FLIGHT PLAN, ALTHOUGH IT WAS AT A HIGHER ALTITUDE, AND SEEING THAT THE CIRRUS WAS AS IT WAS I WAS ALMOST CERTAIN I COULD CONTINUE. I WOULDN'T HAVE TURNED THE PACKAGE ON AT ALL. THIS OF COURSE WAS ONLY MOMENTARY JUST TO GO OVER PUNCH THIS ON, AND CHECK EVERYTHING ELSE.

[REDACTED] DID YOU AT THIS TIME BY ANY CHANCE LOOK AT GROUND SPEED ON THE INS DISPLAY?

25X1A KEN: NO, I DIDN'T.

[REDACTED] LETS TAKE THE NEXT SENTENCE. "I CHECKED PITOT HEAT SWITCH WHICH HAD BEEN ON DURING THE ENTIRE FLIGHT, TURNING IT ON AND OFF THREE TIMES, THEN LEAVING IT ON". THE QUESTION CAME UP, KEN, WAS THERE ANY CHANCE THAT YOU COULD HAVE CONFUSED THIS SWITCH WITH THE TRIM POWER SWITCH?

KEN: I TURNED THE PITOT HEAT ON BETWEEN 20 AND 30 THOUSAND AFTER TAKEOFF, IN THE CLEAR, AN IT WAS ON, THE ENTIRE FLIGHT, ALTHOUGH,

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25X1A DURING THE PORTION OF THE FIRST TURN AROUND THE ROUTE WE WERE NEVER IN WEATHER, OTHER THAN JUST VERY, VERY LIGHT CIRRUS. ALTHOUGH IT DID START PICKING UP ON THE SECOND GO AROUND AND AT THIS TIME I FELT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF A BAD SYSTEM, I'VE HAD THEM BEFORE, AND I KNOW THE INDICATIONS. IT SHOULD GIVE FLUCTUATIONS IN YOUR AIRSPEED AND SO FORTH. SO I CHECKED IT ON. WELL MAYBE SWITCHES SOMETIMES MALFUNCTION SO I TURNED IT OFF, TURNED IT ON, TURNED IT OFF, TURNED IT ON QUITE A FEW TIMES, I DON'T KNOW.

HAVE YOU EVER HAD OCCASION TO CONFUSE TRIM POWER WITH PITOT HEAT, THAT YOU CAN REMEMBER?

25X1A KEN: IT'S TWO DIFFERENT SWITCHES, THEY ARE TWO DIFFERENT SIZE SWITCHES.

25X1A OK, LETS GO TO THE NEXT ONE KEN. "MISSION EQUIPMENT WAS OPERATING SATISFACTORY AND RPM READING READ ABOVE 98 PERCENT.

25X1A KEN: AND THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN "ABOUT".

ABOUT? OK. ABOVE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABOUT 98 PERCENT. DO YOU RECALL AT THIS TIME PUSHING THE THROTTLE BACK UP AGAIN, BY ANY CHANCE?

25X1A KEN: RIGHT AT THIS TIME?

WELL, COINCIDENT WITH THE LOSS OF AIRSPEED AND THE FACT THAT YOU CHECKED RPM, DO YOU RECALL MOVING THE THROTTLES BACK UP? AT THIS TIME?

25X1A KEN: DURING THIS PERIOD I AM ALMOST CERTAIN THAT I PUSHED THE THROTTLES ALL THE WAY BACK.

ALL THE WAY, TO MILITARY?

25X1A KEN: TO IN MILITARY, YES SIR.

OK, DO YOU REMEMBER ---

25X1A KEN: WAIT TIL I CHECK HERE, ONE MINUTE PLEASE. WELL IN MY NOTES,

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I WROTE THIS AT WENDOVER WHEN I WAS JUST SITTING AROUND WAITING FOR THE AIRCRAFT TO COME UP THERE, I HAVE INDICATED HERE APPROXIMATELY 38,000 FEET, OR FLIGHT LEVEL 380, AND DECREASED THE CLIMB, LEVEL, CHECKED THROTTLES TO ASSURE FULL FORWARD AND FRICTION TIGHT.

DO YOU REMEMBER, KEN, LET ME ASK YOU AGAIN, WITH THE MOVEMENT OF THROTTLES FORWARD DO YOU RECALL A RESPONSE, AN INCREASE IN FUEL FLOW OR RPM OR EGT?

KEN: NO, I CHECKED THE RPM BUT THERE IS SUCH LITTLE BIT THAT I ACTUALLY HAD RETARDED THE THROTTLES BEFORE, THEN PUSHED THEM UP, THAT IT MADE THE RPM VERY LITTLE DIFFERENT. UNLESS YOU GET DOWN THERE AND REALLY LOOK AT THE GAUGE YOU DON'T REALLY NOTICE IT, I NOTICED THAT IT WAS ABOUT WHERE IT SHOULD BE. THATS ALL.

YOU DIDN'T, BY ANY CHANCE, REMEMBER GOING INTO AB AT THIS TIME.

KEN: NO, I DID NOT GO INTO AB AT ANY TIME, OTHER THAN TAKEOFF.

OK, NEXT SENTENCE. KEN YOU SAY "I BELIEVE THAT THE FUEL FLOW WAS READING 1800 POUNDS PER ENGINE, I'M NOT POSITIVE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENT CONCERNING FUEL FLOW".

KEN: I'M NOT. I DON'T KNOW WHY THE NUMBER WAS IN MY MIND, BUT WHEN I SAY I WAS WRITING THIS DOWN AND THIS FUEL FLOW AND THE NUMBER OF 1800 AND FUEL FLOW SEEMED TO BE IN MY MIND, AND THAT'S WHAT I WROTE DOWN.

JUST AS A MATTER OF OPINION, KEN, I AM NOT GOING TO TRY AND PIN YOU DOWN, BUT WOULDN'T 1800 POUNDS STRIKE YOU AS BEING AWFUL LOW FOR THIS SITUATION OF MILITARY POWER?

KEN: AT THAT TIME, YES SIR.

DO YOU RECALL, COINCIDENT WITH READING 1800, KEN NOTICING

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RPM OR EGT?

KEN: THE RPM AS I CHECKED WAS STILL ABOUT 98.

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YOU DON'T REMEMBER EGT TO YOU AT THIS TIME?

KEN: NO SIR, I DON'T

25X1A

WAS THERE ANY INDICATION TO YOU, KEN, THAT YOU MIGHT HAVE BEEN GETTING A COMPRESSOR STALL?

KEN: THE ONLY FEEL THAT I GOT OF A STALL IN THE AIRCRAFT WAS AFTER THE THING I BELIEVE REALLY DID STALL, AND THE INDICATION WAS DOWN BELOW 101 IN THE KEAS.

25X1A

BUT NO CLUE OF COMPRESSOR STALL, OR ANYTHING.

KEN: THERE WAS NO SHUDDERING, NO UNUSUAL VIBRATIONS IN THE AIRPLANE AT ALL.

25X1A

OK. COINCIDENT WITH THIS, ROUGHLY AT THE TIME OF YOUR 1800 POUNDS FUEL FLOW DO YOU RECALL ANY WARNING LIGHTS, FUEL LOW LEVEL OR OTHERS?

KEN: NO, THERE WASN'T ANY. TANKS 1, 2 AND 6 WERE EMPTY, RED LIGHTS WERE ON, AND 4 AND 5 GREEN, 3 HAD FUEL IN IT, BUT WASN'T ON AT THAT TIME.

25X1A

4 AND 5 WERE TRANSFERRING?

KEN: YES SIR, THEY WERE GREEN.

25X1A

AND WHAT WERE EMPTY DID YOU SAY?

KEN: 1, 2 AND 6.

25X1A

1, 2 AND 6.

KEN: YES SIR.

25X1A

DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT YOUR TOTAL FUEL WAS AT THIS TIME, ROUGHLY?

SEEMS TO ME THAT I HAD ABOUT 12,000 POUNDS I BELIEVE,

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12 OR 14,000 POUNDS.

25X1A [REDACTED] OK. "AFTER THIS CHECK WHICH REQUIRED ONLY A SECOND OR SO, I IMMEDIATELY NOTICED THE AIRSPEED, KEAS, DECREASING BELOW CRUISE". I ASSUME YOU MEANT 300 KEAS.

KEN: NO, 290. BELOW 290 IS WHAT I WAS TRYING TO MAINTAIN, AND THAT WAS WHAT I MEANT WHEN I SAY BELOW CRUISE. I SHOULD HAVE WRITTEN 290 ON THERE.

25X1A [REDACTED] AT THIS TIME, KEN, HAD YOU BY ANY CHANCE CHECKED YOUR DECREASING KEAS AGAINST THE INDICATOR?

KEN: THE INDICATED AIRSPEED?

25X1A [REDACTED] THE INDICATED AIRSPEED, YES.

KEN: NO SIR I HADN'T. I USED THE TRIPLE DISPLAY.

25X1A [REDACTED] WITH THIS DECREASING AIRSPEED HAD THERE BEEN ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN PITCH AS FAR AS THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR WAS CONCERNED?

KEN: NO.

25X1A [REDACTED] YOU STILL FELT YOU WERE ABOUT THE SAME?

KEN: YES.

25X1A [REDACTED] ALTITUDE, AND SO FORTH?

KEN: WELL, AGAIN THIS IS A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME AND OF COURSE I NOTICED THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR WAS REALLY JUST ABOUT NORMAL. I DIDN'T CHANGE THE PITCH CONTROL WHEEL AND THE

25X1A CONTRAIL I NOTICED WHEN [REDACTED] WENT BY ME, AND OF COURSE THE CONTRAIL WAS FAIRLY STRAIGHT I THINK THAT HE WENT JUST PAST ME. PROBABLY, OR I ASSUME BECAUSE I WAS EITHER LOSING AIRSPEED, OR HE'D INCREASED, BUT I DON'T BELIEVE HE INCREASED HIS AIRSPEED.

25X1A [REDACTED] HIS CONTRAIL WAS ABOVE YOU?

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KEN: NO, HIS CONTRAIL WAS JUST OFF THE RIGHT SIDE.

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25X1A [REDACTED] YOU WOULD SAY YOU WERE ABOUT THE SAME ALTITUDE,
ROUGHLY?

KEN: YES SIR.

25X1A [REDACTED] "WHEN I OBSERVED THE AIRSPEED, KEAS, DROPPING BELOW
160 I INCREASED THE NOSE DOWN ATTITUDE OF THE AIRCRAFT WITH THE
AUTO PILOT PITCH CONTROL WHEEL". KEN, THE QUESTION COMES UP ABOUT
HOW LONG WAS THIS INTERVAL, IF YOU CAN RECALL, BETWEEN READING
290 AND SEEING IT START TO DECREASE AND GETTING DOWN TO 160?

25X1A KEN: WELL IT WAS BELOW 290 AT THIS OTHER TIME, AND I DON'T
THINK IT TOOK VERY LONG, I DON'T IT WAS A MATTER OF A FEW SECONDS.

[REDACTED] QUITE A RAPID DECREASE?

KEN: IT WAS JUST GOING DOWN IT WASN'T JUST DROPPING LIKE YOU'D
DROP SOMETHING, IT WAS JUST CONTINUALLY GOING DOWN.

25X1A [REDACTED] WAS THE MACH -

KEN: THE MACH WAS GOING DOWN ALSO, YES SIR.

25X1A [REDACTED] DID YOU, WHEN YOU GOT DOWN INTO THIS AREA, HAD YOU
CHECKED AGAINST INDICATED AIRSPEED BY ANY CHANCE?

KEN: NO.

25X1A [REDACTED] OK, ATTITUDE STILL LOOKED -

KEN: THE ATTITUDE WAS STILL NORMAL.

25X1A [REDACTED] NEXT SENTENCE. "WHEN I INCREASED THE NOSE DOWN
ATTITUDE OF THE AIRCRAFT WITH THE AUTO PILOT PITCH CONTROL WHEEL".
DO YOU RECALL KEN, ABOUT HOW MUCH YOU INCREASED THE NOSE DOWN?

KEN: FROM THE WHEEL I WOULD SAY FROM A QUARTER TO A HALF INCH,
OR HOW YOU JUDGE THAT THING.

25X1A [REDACTED] WELL, WITH RELATION TO THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR,
DID YOU GIVE A SIGNIFICANT NOSE DOWN.

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KEN: I PUT IT DOWN JUST ABOUT A DOT BELOW, JUST ABOUT A DOT BELOW THE HORIZON. THAT WAS ALL BECAUSE ACTUALLY THAT IS JUST A TRIM, AND I TRY TO USE IT JUST FOR THAT, BUT I JUST WANTED TO GET SOME NOSE DOWN ATTITUDE, IS ABOUT ALL.

25X1A [REDACTED] DO YOU THINK THE AIRCRAFT ACTUALLY RESPONDED TO THIS, DID YOU FEEL YOU WERE NOSING OVER A LITTLE BIT, YOU KNOW THE LESSENING OF WEIGHT IN YOUR SEAT?

KEN: NO, BECAUSE I DON'T THINK, I DON'T THINK I FELT IT. I DON'T THINK THE CHANGE WAS THAT GREAT.

25X1A [REDACTED] WE WERE WONDERING, KEN, WHY YOU USED THE PITCH CONTROL WHEEL INSTEAD OF GOING BACK TO CSC AT THIS TIME AND GETTING A STICK PUSH OVER. ANY PARTICULAR REASON?

KEN: WELL YES, IF THE INSTRUMENTS WERE GOOFING UP OR WERE NOT RESPONDING THE WAY THEY SHOULD BE, I FELT THAT THE AUTO PILOT SYSTEM WOULD HAVE BETTER CONTROL OR MAYBE THE AIRSPEED INDICATORS WERE GOOFING UP OR MAYBE EVEN THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR SO I THOUGHT A SMALL CORRECTION WAS, IN THE WEATHER, WOULD BE THE BEST THING TO DO.

25X1A [REDACTED] RELY ON THE AUTO PILOT?

KEN: YES SIR.

25X1A [REDACTED] OK, NEXT SENTENCE. "THIS WAS A SMALL CORRECTION OF THE PITCH CONTROL WHICH WOULD LOWER THE NOSE SLIGHTLY, NOT WANTING TO DESCEND TO, INTO, MORE DENSE WEATHER".

KEN: THATS JUST WHAT WE DID SIR.

25X1A [REDACTED] DENSE WEATHER, KEN. WERE YOU AWARE THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN CUMULUS CLOUDS BENEATH YOU THAT YOU DIDN'T WANT TO GET INTO?

KEN: NO, ITS JUST THAT I KNEW WE WERE JUST IN THE TOPS OF THE

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25X1A

CIRRUS AT THE TIME, AND THE WINGMAN, [REDACTED] HAD ALREADY GONE BY AND IF HE WAS GOING TO GO AROUND AND PICK ME UP AGAIN THEN WE SHOULD STAY AT THAT ALTITUDE WHERE HE KNEW I HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY. BE EASIER FOR HIM TO SEE ME, AND I DIDN'T KNOW WHAT WAS DOWN BELOW ME.

25X1A

[REDACTED] OK.

KEN: I KNOW THAT THERE WAS SOME BUILDUPS, IN FACT, AS I SAY, WHEN WE WENT DOWN BEFORE WE HAD GOTTEN INTO THE TOP OF ONE BUILDUP. FAIRLY ISOLATED THOUGH.

25X1A

[REDACTED] ANY INDICATION OF PRECIP ON THE WIND SCREEN?

KEN: NONE THAT I NOTICED, NO.

25X1A

[REDACTED] OK, NEXT SENTENCE. "THE AIRSPEED CONTINUED TO DECREASE, AND UPON REACHING 147 KEAS I UTILIZED THE CSC ON THE STICK TO INCREASE THE RATE OF DESCENT, ATTEMPTING TO INCREASE THE AIRSPEED". HERE'S APPARENTLY WHERE YOU PUSHED OVER A LITTLE BIT MORE WITH CSC?

KEN: I DID, I TOOK IT OFF THE AUTO NAV AND USED THE CSC AND IT WASN'T ANY GREAT DEAL OF CORRECTION I NOTICED ON ATTITUDE FOR THE SAME REASON I DIDN'T USE MUCH ON THE PITCH WHEEL.

25X1A

[REDACTED] DID YOU NOTICE KEN, ON YOUR ATTITUDE INDICATOR THAT YOU GOT A RESPONSE TO THIS AND THAT YOU DID NOSE DOWN?

KEN: WELL I GLANCED AT IT AND IT WAS STILL BELOW THE BAR AND I WENT OVER LOOKING AT THE AIRSPEED, AND THE AIRSPEED, I BELIEVE, PICKED UP ABOUT 150/151, AND I FELT FOR THE AMOUNT THAT I HAD, THAT IT SHOULD HAVE INCREASED MORE WITH THE POWER THAT I HAD ON ALREADY. THEREFORE I WENT BACK TO THE CSC OR TO THE AUTO PILOT, ASSUMING THERE WAS SOMETHING WRONG WITH THE AIRSPEED INDICATOR

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OR MAYBE EVEN THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR OF THE FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS,
AND HOPING THAT THAT THING WOULD GO AHEAD AND FLY IT OUT.

25X1A [REDACTED] DO YOU RECALL LOOKING AT THE FUEL FLOW OR ANYTHING
ENGINE WISE?

KEN: RPM.

25X1A [REDACTED] THAT THE RPM WAS ROUGHLY 97 PERCENT.

KEN: 97 OR 98 PERCENT, YES SIR. THROTTLES HADN'T BEEN CHANGED.

25X1A [REDACTED] BUT YOU DON'T REMEMBER FUEL FLOW?

KEN: I DON'T REMEMBER CHECKING IT AND SEEING EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS.

25X1A [REDACTED] OKAY. COINCIDENT WITH THIS CONTROL MOVEMENT KEN,
DO YOU REMEMBER ANY LIGHTNING IN THE SEAT OR ANYTHING TO INDICATE
TO YOU THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS RESPONDING TO FORWARD STICK
MOVEMENT?

KEN: NO IT WASN'T THAT MUCH OF FORWARD STICK MOVEMENT. IT WAS
JUST MORE OF A FORWARD PRESSURE I DIDN'T WANT TO INCREASE THE
NOSE DOWN OR GET IT NOSE DOWN TOO FAR OR CAUSE RAPID DESCENT.

25X1A [REDACTED] OKAY. "I FELT THAT IT WAS NOT GOOD PROCEDURE
GETTING INTO AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF DESCENT IN WEATHER WITH THE
INSTRUMENTS BEING POSSIBLY UNRELIABLE". AS YOU SAY YOU DIDN'T
REALLY MOVE THE STICK FORWARD YOU USED FORWARD PRESSURE ON IT.

KEN: THAT IS WHAT I WOULD PHYSICALLY NOTICE.

25X1A [REDACTED] "ALSO THE AIRSPEED DID NOT IMPROVE DIRECTLY WITH THE
RATE OF DESCENT". THIS INDICATED, KEN, THAT YOU MIGHT HAVE CHECKED
RATE OF DESCENT, DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT IT WAS, AT THIS POINT?

KEN: NO, I THINK THE REFERENCE TO RATE OF DESCENT WAS BAD USAGE
OF WORDS HERE. THIS IS JUST WHAT I EXPLAINED A MINUTE AGO.

I DIDN'T FEEL THAT FOR THE AMOUNT THAT I HAD PUSHED NOSE DOWN

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ON THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR, WHICH OF COURSE HAD GONE DOWN MORE THAN JUST THE ONE DOT BELOW THE BAR, MAKE IT TWO AT THE MOST AND, THAT THE AIRSPEED WAS PICKING UP AS FAST AS IT SHOULD. I DIDN'T FEEL ANY ADVERSE PULL ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. IF I WAS GOING UP, I THINK I WOULD HAVE FELT IT OR EVEN DOWN. IT WAS STRAIGHT AND LEVEL, THE WINGS WERE STRAIGHT AND LEVEL, AND BEING IN THE WEATHER AGAIN I FELT IT WOULD BE BEST TO TRY TO LEVEL IT UP AND MAKE THE THING FEEL THE WAY IT SHOULD.

[REDACTED] AGAIN I MENTION THE FACT THAT YOU GOT RATE OF DESCENT HERE. WHAT GAVE YOU THE FEELING THAT YOU HAD A DESCENT. WAS IT THE ALTIMETER WAS UNWINDING.

KEN: MAINLY I WAS CHECKING ALMOST TOTALLY THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR AND THE AIRSPEEDS, THE MACH, AND THE KEAS.

[REDACTED] OKAY, NEXT SENTENCE: "THERE WAS NO IMPROVEMENT IN THE AIRSPEED. THE AIRSPEED INDICATOR SHOWED A CONTINUED DECREASE, AND I IMMEDIATELY DISENGAGED THE AUTO-NAV AND FLEW WITH CSC". WHEN YOU SAY AIRSPEED INDICATOR, DO YOU MEAN TRIPLE DISPLAY HERE OR BY ANY CHANCE -----?

KEN: YES SIR, TRIPLE DISPLAY.

[REDACTED] YOU STILL HADN'T GONE BACK AND CHECKED INDICATED AIRSPEED?

KEN: NO, IT WAS THE TRIPLE DISPLAY.

[REDACTED] YOU IMMEDIATELY DISENGAGED AUTO-NAV AND FLEW WITH CSC. KEN, AT THIS POINT, WHEN YOU HIT THE BUTTON AGAIN DID YOU NOTICE ANY CHANGES IN CONTROL RESPONSES? IN OTHER WORDS, ANY PITCHING MOMENTS, OR ANYTHING, ON DISENGAGEMENT OF THE AUTO-PILOT?

KEN: NO SIR, YOU COULD FEEL IT A LITTLE BUT WHEN YOU PUNCH THE

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BUTTON BUT THERE'S NOTHING UNUSUAL.

██████████ BUT, NO UNUSUAL FORCES OR ANYTHING?

25X1A

KEN: NO SIR.

██████████ NO HARD-OVER?

25X1A

KEN: NO SIR.

██████████ NEXT SENTENCE: "I CALLED ██████████ MY CHASE

25X1A
25X1A

WINGMAN, AND TOLD HIM I WAS HAVING AIRSPEED TROUBLES. DURING THIS PERIOD I WAS GRADUALLY DESCENDING". HERE AGAIN THE QUESTION OF RATE COMES UP. BY ANY CHANCE HAD YOU YET CHECKED YOUR RATE OF DESCENT, KEN, TO CORRELATE THIS WITH TRIPLE DISPLAY.

KEN: NO, I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE THING EXCEEDED 1,000 FEET. I KNOW THAT IT WAS DOWN BELOW THE LINE, BUT I DIDN'T CHECK TO SEE EXACTLY WHAT I HAD. I WAS FLYING THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR, OR, HOPING I WAS FLYING THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR, AND THAT'S WHY I MADE NO LARGE CORRECTION FOR NOSE DOWN, AND THEN, OF COURSE, I ASSUMED I WAS LEVELING OFF AND I THINK I WENT BACK TO THE AUTO-PILOT, OR AUTO-NAV.

██████████ OKAY KEN, WITH THE DECREASING OF KEAS DID YOU GET ANY WARNING LIGHT INDICATIONS FROM THE PANEL?

25X1A

KEN: YES AFTER THE MACH WENT DOWN TO ABOUT .47 THE SURFACE LIMITER LIGHT CAME ON. THIS IS WHEN I REALLY BEGAN TO WONDER ABOUT IT, BECAUSE I WASN'T REALLY BELIEVING MY AIRSPEED. I THOUGHT THERE WAS JUST SOMETHING WRONG WITH THE TRIPLE DISPLAY INDICATOR. BUT WHEN THIS THING CAME ON AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER, OF COURSE THIS ALL HAPPENED RATHER SUDDENLY, EVEN ON THE AIRSPEED. THIS LIGHT CAME ON AND I ASSUMED THE ONLY TIME IT WOULD COME ON WAS WHEN WE WERE AT THAT AIRSPEED. AND THEN OF COURSE WHEN

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WE REACHED 101 AND I FELT THE SHUDDER, I FELT THEN THAT THE AIRSPEED MUST BE CORRECT.

25X1A

[REDACTED] THIS WAS THE FIRST WARNING LIGHT YOU'D HAD?

KEN: THAT WAS THE ONLY LIGHT THAT HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THIS.

25X1A

[REDACTED] YOU SAID THE ONLY LIGHT THAT HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THIS. DID YOU HAVE MORE WARNING LIGHTS IN THE COCKPIT.

KEN: WELL THESE TWO LIGHTS, THE BYPASS DOORS CLOSED LIGHTS WERE ON. THAT'S WHY I SAY THAT WASN'T THE ONLY LIGHT THAT WAS ON. IT WAS THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT LIGHT.

25X1A

[REDACTED] OKAY. "ABOUT 1200 KEAS, I AGAIN INFORMED HIM THAT I WAS HAVING TROUBLES".

KEN: THIS IS AN ESTIMATE, I DON'T RECALL EXACTLY WHEN IT WAS THAT I CALLED HIM OR THE PRECISE TIMES THAT I CALLED HIM DURING THAT PERIOD.

25X1A

[REDACTED] DID HE GIVE ANY INDICATION TO YOU THAT HE STILL HAD YOU IN SIGHT.

KEN: HE DIDN'T. I KNOW HE HAD GONE BY ME, SO I FELT SURE HE DIDN'T HAVE ME IN SIGHT AT THAT TIME, OR I DIDN'T THINK HE DID. I AM NOT SURE WHETHER HE DID OR NOT.

25X1A

[REDACTED] "WHEN THE AIRSPEED DROPPED TO 101 KEAS, THE AIRCRAFT BEGAN TO SHUDDER AND STALL". DID THIS HAPPEN RIGHT AT 101 OR DID IT START ABOVE THAT?

KEN: IT WAS GOING FROM FAIRLY SMOOTH FLIGHT, ACTUALLY, FOR THE AIRCRAFT. I COULD START FEELING THE SHUDDERS BUT OF COURSE THE AIRSPEED CAUGHT MY UNDIVIDED ATTENTION HERE. AT 101 WAS WHERE THE SHUDDERS BEGAN. OR IF THEY BEGAN EARLIER BEFORE I GLANCED AT IT, IT MAY HAVE BEEN A NOTCH ABOVE THAT.

25X1A

[REDACTED] DO YOU REMEMBER CHECKING THE ATTITUDE INDICATION
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ABOUT THIS TIME?

25X1A KEN: THE ATTITUDE REMAINED THE SAME. STILL SLIGHTLY NOSE DOWN.

[REDACTED] WINGS LEVEL?

25X1A KEN: WINGS LEVEL AND SLIGHTLY NOSE DOWN.

[REDACTED] YOU WERE AT THIS TIME STILL HAD THE CSC BUTTON DOWN.

25X1A KEN: YES.

[REDACTED] HOW DID CONTROL RESPONSES FEEL?

25X1A KEN: WELL, I HAD NO REASON TO TURN ONE WAY OR THE OTHER AND FEELING THE STICK FORCES AND I OF COURSE FELT THE SHUDDER THROUGH THE STICK, AND THEN THROUGH THE WHOLE FUSELAGE OF THE AIRCRAFT, AS IT STALLED AND SNAPPED. MOVING THE STICK OR THE RUDDERS DIDN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE. THIS WAS IN THE CIRRUS. I HAD NO HORIZON TO JUDGE, IN WHAT ACTUAL ATTITUDE I WAS OR IF I WAS OTHER THAN WHAT THE INDICATORS WERE SAYING.

[REDACTED] YOU DIDN'T REFER TO ATTITUDE INDICATOR COINCIDENT WITH THE SNAPPING, OR DO YOU KNOW WHICH WAY THE AIRPLANE ROTATED BY ANY CHANCE?

25X1A KEN: I BELIEVE IT WENT TO THE RIGHT, BUT I COULDN'T REALLY SWEAR.

[REDACTED] IT SNAPPED TO THE RIGHT.

KEN: YES.

25X1A [REDACTED] OK LET ME READ THAT SENTENCE KEN. "I ATTEMPTED TO LOWER THE NOSE WITH REFERENCE TO THE FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS". HERE AGAIN I AM ASSUMING ATTITUDE INDICATION AS YOU HAVE BEEN SAYING. BUT THE AIRCRAFT SNAPPED TWO OR THREE TIMES AND WENT INTO AN INVERTED FLAT SPIN AT APPROXIMATELY 30,000 FEET.

KEN: THIS IS PRETTY MUCH OF AN ESTIMATE. I ASSUMED, I WAS JUST BEFORE REACHING 101 ON THE KEAS ABOUT 32,000 BECAUSE THE

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INDICATED RATE OF DESCENT ACTUALLY HADN'T BEEN THAT GREAT, AND THIS AGAIN IS JUST AN ESTIMATE AS I SAY APPROXIMATELY 30,000.

DO YOU RECALL WHAT YOU DID WITH THE CONTROLS, KEN, DID YOU TRY A SPIN RECOVERY WITH IT?

KEN: I MOVED THEM TO EITHER SIDE, THE AILERONS, AND PUSHED THE NOSE FORWARD AND PUSHED IN ONE RUDDER, THE LEFT RUDDER, THE RIGHT RUDDER, AND THE STICK DID NOTHING. I MEAN THE AIRCRAFT DID NOTHING IN RESPONSE TO THE STICK.

DID YOU HAVE NEGATIVE "G'S" AT THIS TIME?

KEN: AT THE TIME OF SNAP I DON'T BELIEVE THAT I DID.

DURING THE SPINNING MOTIONS DO YOU REMEMBER ANYTHING REGARDING "G'S"?

KEN: NO.

OK, NEXT SENTENCE. "I INFORMED [REDACTED] THAT I WAS IN A SPIN. AFTER AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ROTATIONS, I WOULD ESTIMATE NEAR 25,000 FEET". ARE YOU JUST GUESSING HERE, KEN, OR DO YOU REMEMBER READING IT.

KEN: NO, AT THAT TIME I DIDN'T READ IT, IN FACT I WOULD SAY THAT THEY WEREN'T NEGATIVE "G'S", THAT THERE WERE POSITIVE "G'S". SOMEWHERE ALONG THE LINE HERE, BECAUSE I KNOW THAT I WAS PULLED FORWARD. IT WAS VERY EASY TO LOOK DOWN IN THE POSITION THAT I HAD ASSUMED, AND REACHED DOWN AND PULLED THE LANYARD.

OK. I'LL FINISH READING THE SENTENCE. "AND AFTER ATTEMPTING TO RIGHT THE AIRCRAFT OR GAIN CONTROL WHICH WAS FUTILE I DECIDED TO EJECT". KEN, DURING THIS ATTEMPT TO RECOVER DID YOU DO ANYTHING WITH THROTTLES?

KEN: NO, THE THROTTLES WERE FORWARD. I DIDN'T THINK AFTERBURNER

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25X1A WOULD MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE. THIS HAPPENED VERY SUDDENLY.

25X1A [REDACTED] SO FAR AS YOU CAN RECALL THEY WERE STILL IN MILITARY.

KEN: YES SIR.

25X1A [REDACTED] DURING ANY OF THESE OSCILLATIONS, THE LAST STAGES OF SLOWING UP PINNING AND SO FORTH, DO YOU REMEMBER SEEING ANY BREAKS IN CLOUDS OR ANY HORIZON, OR REFERENCE YOU COULD CROSS CHECK?

25X1A KEN: NOT AT ALL, COMPLETELY ON THE GAUGES.

[REDACTED] "I LOOKED DOWN AT THE EJECTION, GOT A FIRM GRIP, AND TRIED TO POSITION MY HEAD IN THE HEAD REST AND PULLED". THE STATEMENT, TRIED TO POSITION MY HEAD. I ASSUME THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE OF THE POSITIVE "G'S".

KEN: WELL THAT AND I DIDN'T KNOW EXACTLY, EITHER, AS I SAY, WHEN YOU PULL THE HANDLE IT GOES UP VERY RAPIDLY TOO. BUT I ASSUMED THAT IT WAS MORE BECAUSE OF THE THICKNESS OF THE CHUTE AND THE POSITION OF THE HEAD REST, THAT I COULDN'T GET MY HEAD ALL THE WAY BACK.

25X1A [REDACTED] YOU WEREN'T HAVING TO MOVE YOUR HEAD AGAINST ANY FORCES?

KEN: I'M NOT REALLY SURE OF WHAT IT WAS, EITHER THE CHUTE OR SOME OF THE "G" FORCES.

25X1A [REDACTED] THEN YOU SAY I WAS IN AN INVERTED POSITION THUS EJECTING DOWNWARD. WHY DID YOU FEEL THAT YOU WERE INVERTED KEN, I KEEP COMING BACK TO THIS, NEGATIVE "G'S" OR WHAT?

KEN: THE AIRPLANE SNAPPED AND IT STAYED THAT WAY. JUST SORT OF THE SENSATION THAT I HAD, THAT THE AIRCRAFT WENT TO THE RIGHT IN IT'S FLAT INVERTED SPIN. THIS MAY BE MORE OF AN ASSUMPTION THAN ANYTHING ELSE.

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[REDACTED] "THE CANOPY AND EJECTION SEAT APPARENTLY FUNCTIONED

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PROPERLY, I FELT THE SEAT PUSH AWAY STRAPS SEPARATED ME FROM THE SEAT AND THEN THE DROGUE CHUTE DEPLOYED. AT THAT TIME I CHECKED MY WATCH WHICH READ 1205".

KEN: RIGHT. THATS NOT EXACTLY THE TIME OF THE DEPLOYMENT. AFTER THE CHUTE HAD DEPLOYED, THE DROGUE CHUTE, AND I WAS DESCENDING. ASSUMING THAT I WAS RIGHTED BY THE DROGUE CHUTE. I HAD LOOKED AT MY WATCH AND IT WAS 1205.

25X1A [REDACTED] YOU WERE JUST HOPING TO TIME YOUR FALL IS THAT WHY YOU LOOKED AT THE WATCH?

KEN: WELL THAT AND I DON'T KNOW, I GUESS THERE IS NOTHING ELSE TO DO AT THAT TIME.

25X1A [REDACTED] "SHORTLY AFTER THE DROGUE CHUTE SEPARATED, DEPLOYING THE MAIN CHUTE".

25X1A KEN: IT GAVE ME A START.

[REDACTED] THE CUT AWAY OF THE DROGUE, THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THAT AND THE MAIN CHUTE OPENING?

25X1A KEN: YES. I THOUGHT FOR A MOMENT I HAD LOST THE ENTIRE CHUTE.

[REDACTED] IN OTHER WORDS NOTICEABLE ACCELERATION.

KEN: WELL AT THE MOMENT IT JUST SORT OF FEELS LIKE YOU'RE HOLDING ON TO A ROPE AND SOMEONE CUT A ROPE.

25X1A [REDACTED] RIGHT.

KEN: YOU KNOW, ITS JUST SORT OF YOU DROP, AND THEN THE MAIN COMES OUT VERY NICELY.

25X1A [REDACTED] KEN, YOU HAD MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY IN CONVERSATION THAT YOU NOTICED PRECIP, RAIN, HAIL, SNOW.

KEN: NO, SNOW AND NO HAIL.

25X1A [REDACTED] NO SNOW AND HAIL?

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25X1A KEN: NO HAIL, THERE WAS SNOW DURING THE DESCENT AND IT WAS RAINING, THERE WAS A THUNDER STORM NEAR WHERE I WAS DESCENDING OR ALONG SIDE ME. AFTER I GOT ON THE GROUND, IT WAS STILL THERE AND IT WAS MOVING TOWARDS WHERE I HAD TOUCHED DOWN.

[REDACTED] ALRIGHT, DO YOU RECALL, WAS THIS THROUGH THE ENTIRE NYLON DESCENT?

KEN: NO, I GOT A LITTLE SNOW AND THEN I GOT A BIT OF RAIN, VERY LITTLE ACTUALLY. THE MAJORITY OF THE DESCENT IT WAS JUST A VERY LIGHT RAIN.

25X1A [REDACTED] I SEE. YOU SEE WHAT WE ARE AFTER HERE, YOU HADN'T MENTIONED ANY TURBULENCE ASSOCIATED WITH CUMULUS CLOUDS.

25X1A KEN: NO.

[REDACTED] THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY YOU MENTIONED NO CUMULUS. WE WERE WONDERING WHERE THE RAIN CAME FROM.

25X1A KEN: WELL COMING DOWN I COULD SEE THE CLOUDS.

[REDACTED] WE HAVE COMPLETED REVIEWING THE 25 MAY STATEMENT. I WOULD LIKE NOW TO OPEN THIS SESSION UP FOR QUESTIONS BY MEMBERS OF THE COORDINATING GROUP AND ADVISORS.

25X1A QUESTION: ON THE RPM YOU HAD MAINTAINED IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 97 AND 98 PERCENT.

KEN: YES.

QUESTION: MOST OF THE FLIGHT YOU MADE A SMALL REDUCTION AND LATER ADVANCED THE THROTTLES TO FULL THROTTLE. THIS IS WHAT I UNDERSTOOD YOU TO SAY, FULL THROTTLE, AND THEN YOU CONTINUED TALKING OF 98 PERCENT. AT THIS ALTITUDE HAD YOU BEEN EXPERIENCING 98 PERCENT AT FULL THROTTLE?

KEN: I CAN'T RIGHTLY SAY. THE DECREASE IN THE THROTTLES,

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WHEN I MENTIONED THE DECREASE, WAS VERY SLIGHT AND AS FAR AS THE RPM, I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE MAYBE ONE OR TWO PERCENT. WITH THE GAUGE AS IT IS, AND AS SMALL AS IT IS, THERE IS NO WAY OF KNOWING PRECISELY WHEN YOU HAVE 96, 97 AND 98. IT'S ABOUT THERE, AND I DID RETARD THE THROTTLES SLIGHTLY, PROBABLY VERY INSIGNIFICANTLY, AND I ASSURED MYSELF THAT THE THROTTLES WERE FULL FORWARD WHEN I CHECKED.

QUESTION: THEN YOU WENT TO FULL THROTTLE?

KEN: YES, TO CHECK, TO MAKE SURE.

QUESTION: BUT DURING YOUR CRUISE EARLIER IN YOUR FLIGHT, DID YOU HAVE A FEELING THAT YOU WERE RUNNING AT FULL POWER?

KEN: WELL, MY MACH HAD VARIED FROM .85 TO .87. NO I DON'T BELIEVE IT WAS FULL THROTTLE AT THE TIME. I MEAN NOT MAX. IT WAS PRETTY CLOSE TO IT.

QUESTION: QUESTION ON YOUR AFTERBURNERS. WHEN YOU WERE DROPPING SPEED RAPIDLY YOU INDICATED HERE FROM 300 DOWN TO 160, DID YOU EVER CONSIDER USING AFTERBURNER TO SEE WHETHER IT WAS SOMETHING WRONG WITH ENGINES.

KEN: THIS IS NOT CLEAR IN MY MIND. BUT I FELT THE USE OF AFTERBURNER WAS NOT THE PROPER PROCEDURE, DUE TO BEING IN THE WEATHER, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ADVERSE EFFECT

OR POSSIBILITY ONE AFTERBURNER OR MAYBE NOT ANY AFTERBURNER.

AND I FELT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO MAINTAIN A--, SAY THAT THE INSTRUMENT I WAS READING WAS NOT NECESSARILY RIGHT, I HAD NO WAY OF CONFIRMING THAT AT ALL. I ASSUME MY ATTITUDE INDICATOR WAS CORRECT BECAUSE [REDACTED] HAD BEEN FLYING MY WING DURING THE ENTIRE MISSION

AND WHEN YOU'RE IN THE WEATHER YOU HAVE TO RELY ON YOUR

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INSTRUMENTS UNTIL THEY JUST COMPLETELY FAIL YOU, OR SOMETHING ELSE SHOWS YOU THAT THEY'RE NOT RELIABLE.

QUESTION: WELL, THEN AT THE TIME THAT YOU WERE INDICATING MACH 1.05, [REDACTED] WAS PASSING YOU BECAUSE YOU ARE GOING TO SLOW FOR HIM.

KEN: NO. (I DIDN'T BELIEVE SO)

QUESTION: IT IS THE INDICATION THAT WE HAVE HERE ANYWAY.

KEN: I DON'T BELIEVE THAT IS WHAT WAS SAID EXACTLY, HE WAS HAVING TO MAKE A LARGER TURN THAN I DID. I ASSUME THAT HE INCREASED HIS RPM ON THE 101. I DON'T KNOW THAT HE WAS PASSING ME. HE PASSED ME AFTER I HAD LEVELED OUT, AND I'D SEEN THE CONTRAILS. I THINK HE SAID HE WAS PASSING ME AND I HAD SEEN CONTRAILS. I DID NOT SEE HIM.

QUESTION: I ASKED A QUESTION EARLIER. IF HE HAD ANY INDICATION DURING THE TURN THAT THE CHASE WAS OVERRUNNING, AND YOU SAID AT THE TIME THAT YOU DIDN'T KNOW UNTIL YOU SAW HIM PASS YOU.

KEN: THAT IS CORRECT, NOT UNLESS HE'D CALLED ME AND SAID HE WAS OVERRUNNING ME. WHICH HE DID. PRIOR TO THAT I ASSUME THAT HE HAD NOT.

QUESTION: KEN, HOW LONG WOULD YOU SAY THIS ALL HAPPENED, THE TIME YOU STARTED DECREASING BELOW CRUISE UNTIL YOU HIT THE STALL SPEED? WAS IT A MATTER OF 15 SECONDS, THIRTY SECONDS, TWO MINUTES?

KEN: I WOULD SAY IT WAS LESS THAN FIVE MINUTES, I CAN'T HONESTLY SAY WHAT IT WAS EXACTLY.

QUESTION: NEXT COUPLE OF QUESTIONS I AM GOING TO ASK MAY APPEAR A LITTLE BLUNT, THEY ARE NOT MEANT AS A CRITICISM BUT ONLY TO DEVELOP ALL POSSIBILITIES.

KEN: YES SIR.

QUESTION: YOU INDICATED THAT YOU WENT BACK TO AUTO-PILOT BECAUSE

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YOU FELT IT WOULD TAKE OVER AND CORRECT, DID YOU HAVE ANY LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN YOUR FLIGHT INDICATOR?

KEN: NO, I DIDN'T HAVE A LACK OF CONFIDENCE AS SUCH, BECAUSE I HAD NO REAL REASON TO. AS I JUST STATED, THE ENTIRE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN FUNCTIONING PROPERLY, AND I COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY, ALL OF A SUDDEN, THIS THING SHOULD START HAPPENING, WHAT EVER IT WAS THAT WAS HAPPENING, AND I ASSUMED THAT THE AIRSPEED WAS GOING THE WAY IT WAS,

APPARENTLY, THAT THE AIRSPEED INDICATOR WAS MALFUNCTIONING, AND NOT THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR. THE CONTRAIL WAS STRAIGHT BY ME, OR SEEMED TO BE STRAIGHT BY ME. I ASSUMED HE WAS IN LEVEL FLIGHT ABOUT THE SAME ATTITUDE I WAS IN. THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR HAD BEEN WORKING PROPERLY. IT SEEMED TO BE WITHIN A VERY SMALL DEGREE OF BEING STRAIGHT AND LEVEL. I HAD CHECKED THE INSTRUMENTS DURING THE FLIGHT FOR THE ENTIRE ROUTE. THE VERTICAL SPEED AND ATTITUDE I HAD CHECKED THOSE TWO AGAINST EACH OTHER AND MAKING JUST VERY MINOR ADJUSTMENTS ON THE PITCH CONTROL WHEEL TO TRY TO MAINTAIN ALTITUDE. THIS DOES NOT HAVE AN ALTITUDE HOLD, AND I WAS TRYING TO MAINTAIN A PRECISE ALTITUDE FOR THE V OVER H FACTOR ON THE PACKAGE, AND EVEN THOUGH IT WAS STAYING WITHIN JUST A FRACTION OF THE WIDTH OF THE NEEDLE ON THE VERTICAL SPEED, AND ON THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR, THE THING WOULD STILL GAIN SLIGHTLY. I DON'T REMEMBER THE DISTANCE FROM HERE TO WENDOVER WHEN I CAME BACK BUT I THINK IT WAS MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED MILES.

FROM THE FLOOR: ABOUT 223 MILES.

KEN: IT GAINED SOME. ON THE FIRST RUN I GAINED, I THINK,

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FOUR HUNDRED/FIVE HUNDRED FEET. NOT OVER, I'D SAY, ABOUT FOUR HUNDRED FEET IN THAT INSTANCE, IN JUST LETTING IT CONTROL ITSELF, AND JUST HAVING MADE MY MINOR ADJUSTMENTS ON THE THUMB SCREW TO SEE WHAT IT WOULD DO. WELL THIS ISN'T TOO BAD, BUT AS FOR THE AIRCRAFT AND SYSTEM ITSELF, I DON'T BELIEVE EVEN TO THIS DAY. I HAVE NO RESERVATIONS ABOUT FLYING THE AIRCRAFT OR THE EQUIPMENT THAT IS IN IT, OR THE RELIABILITY OF THE EQUIPMENT.

QUESTION: WELL LET ME ASK YOU A COUPLE QUESTIONS. IT APPEARS TO ME THAT YOU HAD DIAGNOSED YOUR TROUBLE AS AIRSPEED INDICATOR MALFUNCTION. AS YOU STARTED APPROACHING A PRETTY LOW INDICATED AIRSPEED, IF YOU HAD MADE THIS DIAGNOSIS, WHY DIDN'T IT OCCUR TO YOU TO CROSS CHECK WITH YOUR INDICATED AIRSPEED? TO CONFIRM THAT YOUR DIAGNOSIS WAS CORRECT? NOW HERE AGAIN I AM NOT AIMING THIS AS A CRITICISM BUT JUST TO DETERMINE ANY PERTINENT FACTORS HERE.

KEN: WELL, I UNDERSTAND. THAT'S QUITE ALRIGHT, AND I AM NOT SURE THAT I DIDN'T BUT I CAN NOT RECALL, IN FACT, HAVING FLOWN FOR A WHILE, AND SO FORTH, I KNOW ON NORMAL INSTRUMENT FLIGHTS YOU CHECK YOUR INSTRUMENTS, I CHECK MY INSTRUMENTS. BUT I COULD NOT RECALL AND SAY, THE SAME FOR THE FUEL FLOW OR THE EGT. I CAN'T SAY EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS. I ASSUME THAT I HAD CHECKED MY INSTRUMENTS NORMALLY AND THE FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS DURING THIS PROCEDURE. I CAN NOT HONESTLY SAY THAT I KNOW WHAT IT WAS OR THAT I DID DO THIS. I WASN'T SURE, THE ONLY THING I ASSUMED AT THE TIME, I THOUGHT I COULD ASSUME AT THAT TIME, THAT IT WAS AIRSPEED DIFFICULTY AND I THINK YOUR QUESTION IS VERY VALID. I WONDERED THIS MYSELF.

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QUESTION: DO YOU THINK ITS POSSIBLE YOU DID CHECK IT AND SAW THAT IT WAS IN NORMAL OPERATING RANGE, AND THIS MORE OR LESS CONFIRMED YOUR DECISION OR YOU CAN'T SAY ONE WAY OR THE OTHER?

KEN: I CAN'T SAY, I WAS THINKING ABOUT THE INDICATED AIRSPEED WHEN I WAS WRITING MY NOTES AT WENDOVER AND I WAS TRYING TO THINK WHAT DID IT SAY. JUST ABOUT THE SAME AS YOUR QUESTION AND I COULD NOT RECALL.

QUESTION: SAME WAY WITH ALTITUDE, EXCUSE ME JACK, YOUR ALTIMETER, YOUR CONVENTIONAL ALTIMETER WAS THAT CHECKED AGAINST THE TRIPLE DISPLAY?

KEN: NO, NO, THE ALTIMETER NEVER PARTICULARLY ENTERED MY MIND. I MEAN, I KNEW THAT I HAD THE APPROXIMATE ALTITUDE THAT I WANTED AND I HAD NO REASON TO DOUBT THAT I WAS ANY OTHER PLACE.

QUESTION: AGAIN, YOU KNOW THIS WOULD LEAD TO WONDERING ABOUT THE WHOLE TRIPLE DISPLAY GAUGE, AS TO ITS RELIABILITY.

KEN: THE WHOLE GAUGE, YES SIR.

QUESTION: NOW, WE KNOW YOUR PAST RECORD, KEN, AND CAPABILITIES AND WE KNOW THAT REACTIONS ARE FAST AND NORMAL. THE NORMAL REACTION IS AS YOU WENT THROUGH ABOUT 140 INDICATED AND YOUR LIMITER LIGHT CAME ON, AND THIS CONFIRMED YOUR AIRSPEED, THIS PUT YOU IN A DILEMMA BECAUSE IT WENT AGAINST YOUR ORIGINAL DIAGNOSIS, IF THIS WAS YOUR DIAGNOSIS.

KEN: WELL, IT WAS MY ASSUMPTION THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG WITH THE AIRSPEED.

QUESTION: NORMALLY THE REACTION HERE WOULD BE TO TRADE OFF ALTITUDE, TO MAKE A LARGE NOSE DOWN CORRECTION AND POSSIBLY GO INTO AB.

KEN: WELL I WASN'T SURE WHAT THE AB WOULD DO, WHETHER IT WOULD

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MAKE MORE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE AIRCRAFT, OR NOT, AND UNTIL JUST AT THE LAST MOMENT, THERE, ACTUALLY WHEN THE AIRCRAFT STALLED, I ASSUMED THAT THE AIRSPEED WAS MALFUNCTIONING. THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR AND ALL. I WAS DESCENDING SOME, AND WITH FULL POWER, I, OF COURSE, HAVING NOTHING TO MAKE A REFERENCE TO, OTHER THAN WHAT I HAD IN THE AIRCRAFT. MAYBE WITH ANOTHER AIRCRAFT I COULD HAVE SAID, WELL YES, HE IS WAY AHEAD OF ME, OR HE IS JUST SITTING ON MY WING, OR WHEREVER HE WAS AT THE TIME.

QUESTION: HOW LONG WOULD YOU SAY BETWEEN THE LIMITER LIGHT COMING ON, WHICH WOULD CAUSE ANY INDIVIDUAL TO START WONDERING WHAT WAS GOING ON, AND THE TIME YOU REACHED THE STALL SPEED, CAN YOU ESTIMATE THAT TIME?

KEN: I WOULD SAY A MATTER OF SECONDS. IT WASN'T A SLOW PROCESS YOU KNOW, A KNOT OR TWO HERE OR THERE OVER THE LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

QUESTION: AT THIS TIME DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAD FULL POWER, OR I MEAN HIGH POWER AT LEAST 98 PERCENT?

KEN: THE THROTTLES AND THE RPM ARE MORE, I KNOW WHAT THEY READ. I KNOW THE THROTTLES WERE PUSHED FORWARD. OH, I DON'T KNOW THAT THEY WERE FULL, THERE IS REALLY NO STOP THAT YOU PUSH UP TO, BECAUSE OF THE WATER INJECTION, SO I FEEL THAT THEY WERE PUSHED FULL FORWARD.

QUESTION: IF THIS WERE THE CASE, THAT YOU HAD FULL POWER ON, AND WE KNOW THE AIRCRAFT STALLED, YOU WOULD HAVE HAD TO BE AT ABOUT A 25 DEGREE PITCH UP ATTITUDE. WAS THERE ANY INDICATION AT ALL OTHER THAN YOUR INSTRUMENTS THAT YOU MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN A HIGH NOSE UP ATTITUDE?

KEN: OTHER THAN THE FACT THAT IT STALLED, I ASSUMED THAT I WAS

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DESCENDING SLIGHTLY - GRADUALLY.

QUESTION: WELL YOU COULD HAVE BEEN SETTLING, BUT IF YOU HAD POWER IN ORDER TO GET THE STALL AND IF THE INSTRUMENTS WERE CORRECT, THEN YOU MUST HAVE BEEN AT A VERY HIGH NOSE UP ATTITUDE. AND YOU DIDN'T GET ANY INDICATION OF THIS, YOU WERE IN SOLID OVERCAST AT THIS TIME.

KEN: I WAS IN CIRRUS. I HAD NO VISUAL REFERENCE, YOU KNOW, OUTSIDE THE AIRCRAFT.

QUESTION: KEN, DID YOU SEE THE SUN AT ALL THROUGH THE CIRRUS.

KEN: NOT THE SUN AS SUCH, IT WAS LIGHT ABOVE US.

QUESTION: WHAT WOULD YOU ESTIMATE YOUR VISIBILITY IN THE CIRRUS AT THAT TIME.

KEN: OH, I DON'T KNOW.

QUESTION: YOU WERE ABLE TO SEE THE CONTRAILS FROM THE OTHER AIRCRAFT?

KEN: I SAW THEM YES, HE WENT JUST OFF MY RIGHT WING.

QUESTION: SO IT WASN'T REAL HEAVY CIRRUS, IT WAS THIN?

KEN: WELL THIS WAS OF COURSE AT THE BEGINNING OF IT AND PRIOR TO ANY DESECENT THAT I WAS MAKING, SO AT THAT TIME, COUPLE THOUSAND FEET, MAYBE.

QUESTION: TURBULENCE.

KEN: THERE WAS NO TURBULENCE.

QUESTION: ASSUMING THAT YOU WERE CONSIDERING YOU HAD AN AIRSPEED MALFUNCTION AND ALL, AND THIS WAS A PROBLEM, WHEN DID YOU FIRST FEEL THAT SOMETHING WAS RADICALLY WRONG?

KEN: WELL, JUST ABOUT THE TIME THAT THE LIGHT COMES ON, AND THEN OF COURSE SHORTLY AFTER THAT, A MATTER OF SECONDS, THE SPEED

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WAS DOWN TO 101 AND IT WAS STALLING, AND THAT'S NATURALLY WHEN IT WAS IN THE STALL THAT I FELT SOMETHING WAS RADICALLY WRONG.

QUESTION: THEN IN OTHER WORDS, DURING THIS PRECEEDING TIME, YOU WERE MAKING AN ASSUMPTION THAT THE AIRSPEED INDICATOR WAS IN ERROR, AND ALL YOUR ACTIONS WERE TAKEN JUST RATHER MATTER OF FACTLY AND ALMOST WITH THIS ASSUMPTION IN MIND. I DON'T THINK THAT IS A FAIR STATEMENT, IN OTHER WORDS MY FIRST QUESTION WAS, WHAT I WAS INTERESTED IN, WHEN DID YOU FEEL THE "BOY, SOMETHING, SOMETHING, IS REALLY GOING HAYWIRE HERE", RATHER THAN JUST A QUESTION ON MY INSTRUMENTS IN ERROR.

KEN: WELL THAT WAS IT, JUST ABOUT THAT TIME.

QUESTION: YOU CAN'T RECALL ANY FEELING OR INDICATIONS OR CHANGES IN YOUR PHYSICAL CONDITION, SUCH AS HYPOXIA, OR VERTIGO, DISORIENTATION?

KEN: NO, SIR I DID NOT HAVE VERTIGO, THAT I KNOW OF, I DIDN'T HAVE HYPOXIA, I THINK IF I HAD, WHEN I'D GOTTEN MY, THIS IS AN ASSUMPTION, WHEN I'D GOTTEN THE EMERGENCY OXYGEN I WOULD HAVE NOTICED A DIFFERENCE. IF IT WERE SOMETHING, SAY, IN THE SHIPS OXYGEN SYSTEM, SOMETHING MALFUNCTIONING THERE THAT I DID HAVE HYPOXIA, THEN I WOULD HAVE NOTICED. BUT AS FAR AS MY FACULTIES I THOUGHT I HAD COMPLETE CONTROL OF THOSE MOST OF THE TIME. THE TIME FROM WHEN THE DROGUE CHUTE OPENED, AND THE MAIN CHUTE OPENED, I'M EXACTLY SURE. BUT, I DIDN'T FEEL LIGHT HEADED, NOT THAT I KNOW OF, OR THAT I CAN HONESTLY SAY RIGHT NOW. I DIDN'T FEEL THAT WAY WHEN I WAS ON THE GROUND. I THINK THERE IS A CERTAIN, OH, NOT A SENSE OF REAL FEAR, YOU KNOW, BUT THERE IS A

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SENSE OF ANXIETY ABOUT THE THING WHEN YOU GET OUT OF THE AIRCRAFT.

I'M SURE I FELT THIS ON THE WAY DOWN.

QUESTION: THAT IS ADRENALIN WORKING.

KEN: THAT IS PROBABLY SO.

QUESTION: KEN, FROM YOUR PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING IN YOUR BACKGROUND, YOU KNOW THE OLD ROUTINE ABOUT, WHAT ARE YOUR SYMPTOMS FOR HYPOXIA, AND THE EMPHASIS ON THIS IN PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING. DO YOU RECALL WHAT YOURS ARE IN PARTICULAR? LIGHTHEADEDNESS, OR DIZZINESS, BLURRED VISION, OR DO YOU HAVE ANY PARTICULAR SYMPTOMS?

KEN: I HAVE NEVER KNOWN THAT I REALLY HAD ANY. I HAVE HAD VERTIGO MANY TIMES.

QUESTION: HAVE YOU EVER, IN THE CHAMBER, UNDERGONE THE EXPERIENCE OF GOING WITHOUT YOUR MASK FOR A PRIOD OF TIME TO ACTUALLY GET INTO IT?

KEN: WELL THEY DO THIS. THIS IS A STANDARD PROCEDURE IN THE CHAMBER. WHILE IN THE AIR FORCE, THERE ARE TIMES THAT YOU GO IN THE CHAMBER THAT THEY REMOVE YOUR MASK AND YOU WRITE YOUR NUMBERS OR YOU WRITE YOUR NAME AND THIS SORT OF THING. I KNEW THESE SENSATIONS.

QUESTION: WHEN YOU GET BACK ON OXYGEN, DO YOU RECALL HAVING WRITTEN THINGS THIS WAY AND DONE THINGS THIS WAY.

KEN: OH, I DON'T KNOW. I HAVEN'T NOTICED. THEY ONLY DO THAT EVERY THREE YEARS.

QUESTION: KEN, YOU SAY YOU KNOW DIZZINESS AND THIS SORT OF THING ACCOMPANIES THIS?

KEN: ONCE YOU GET THE OXYGEN BACK.

QUESTION: BUT YOU DON'T RECALL ANY OF THIS TYPE THING ASSOCIATED WITH THIS EXPERIENCE?

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KEN: NO.

QUESTION: SO THE MASK FIT FINE, NO DIFFICULTY IN BREATHING?

KEN: CORRECT, NO DIFFICULTY.

QUESTION: HAVE YOU EVER HAD OCCASION IN THIS AIRCRAFT TO HAVE HOOKED UP YOUR MASK BEFORE YOU TURNED THE OXYGEN ON SO YOU KNOW WHAT THAT FEELS LIKE.

KEN: YES, I DO THAT ALMOST ALL THE TIME, YOU KNOW, BECAUSE YOU THINK YOU GOT THE HOSE PLUGGED IN, AND PUT IT ON. I PUT THE MASK ON AND OF COURSE YOU CAN'T BREATHE VERY WELL.

QUESTION: IT'S VERY NOTICEABLE.

KEN: YES SIR.

QUESTION: YOU DIDN'T NOTICE THAT AT ALL.

KEN: NO SIR, I DIDN'T

QUESTION: THERE WERE NO OTHER INDICATIONS OF LOSS OF POWER?

KEN: NONE THAT I COULD RECALL SIR.

QUESTION: THERE ARE TWO POSSIBILITIES THAT IT COULD STALL OUT, WHEN LEVEL IN FLIGHT LIKE THAT IF YOU HAVE A LOSS OF POWER. THE OTHER ONE IS THAT IF YOU HADN'T LOST POWER, YOU MUST HAVE BEEN AT A PRETTY HIGH ANGLE OF CLIMB.

KEN: YOU MEAN WITH FULL POWER, CLIMBING UP?

ANSWER: YES.

KEN: I THINK HAD I BEEN IN THAT ATTITUDE CLIMB OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, ALTHOUGH IT WAS SHORT, A SHORT DURATION OF TIME, I THINK I WOULD HAVE BEEN OUT OF THIS CIRCUS.

QUESTION: YOU WOULD THINK SO. ALTHOUGH THE OTHER POSSIBILITY IS - - -

KEN: I WOULD HAVE FELT IT.

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QUESTION: FELT IT OR - - -

KEN: THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR, I ASSUME, UNLESS SOMETHING WAS WRONG WITH IT. BUT WHY WOULD IT BE, WELL WHY DID ANY OF THIS HAPPEN ALL SUDDENLY?

QUESTION: WELL, LET ME ASK THIS ONE QUESTION. WHAT WOULD THE SPEED OF THE AIRCRAFT BE IN A NOSE DOWN ATTITUDE. I DON'T MEAN EXACT SPEED BUT WE WOULD BE WELL ABOVE THESE SORT OF SPEEDS IF THE AIRCRAFT ACTUALLY WAS POINTED DOWN, WHETHER IT HAD POWER OR NOT. IS THIS NOT TRUE?

KEN: I DON'T QUITE UNDERSTAND.

QUESTION: WITH THE AIRCRAFT AT A NOSE DOWN ATTITUDE EVEN WITH POWER, WITH A LOSS OF POWER, YOU WOULD BE HAVING A LOT HIGHER SPEED THAN YOU HAD, WHICH WOULD LEAD US TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE AT A NOSE UP ATTITUDE TO SLOW DOWN.

QUESTION: I THINK THE INTERESTING QUESTION HERE IS WITH THE ROUGHLY TWO BAR WIDTHS NOSE DOWN, KEN, IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO EXAMINE, AND SAY ROUGHLY 1800 POUNDS PER ENGINE FUEL FLOW, WHICH

IS JUST ABOVE IDLE, REALLY AT THIS POINT, WHAT THE RATE OF BLEED-OFF SPEED WOULD BE IF YOU HELD THAT ATTITUDE,

KEN: YES, THAT WOULD BE INTERESTING.

QUESTION: IT WOULD BE VERY INTERESTING TO CHECK THIS OUT AND SEE. THIS MIGHT GIVE US A CLUE AS TO WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE.

KEN: WELL, WE HAD BURNED MORE THAN HALF THE AMOUNT OF FUEL AT THAT TIME AND THE AIRCRAFT WASN'T BY ANY MEANS AT MAXIMUM WEIGHT, AND THIS AIRCRAFT WILL FLY VERY COMFORTABLY AT 170. WHEN I SAY

MAXIMUM FUEL LOAD, I'M TALKING ABOUT THE AMOUNT THAT WE'VE BEEN

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FLYING AROUND WITH ON MOST OF OUR TRAINING MISSIONS. IT FLYS AROUND COMFORTABLY THEN, WHICH I'VE DONE. AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE PRECISE STALL SPEED IS. OF COURSE, I THINK YOU WOULD HAVE TO FIGURE OUT THE CG AND THEN ALL OF THIS OTHER, ASSUMING YOU KNOW THE GROSS WEIGHT OF THE AIRCRAFT AND SO FORTH. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE STALL SPEED IS. BUT WITH WHAT I ASSUMED I HAD, EVEN SAY ABOUT 147 KNOTS KEAS, WHICH IS ACTUALLY HIGHER INDICATED, I ASSUME THAT THIS WOULD GIVE ADEQUATE AMOUNT OF AIRSPEED FOR, WITH THE SET I HAD, TO KEEP THE AIRCRAFT GOING, AND DESCENDING AT, SHALL WE SAY, A MODERATE RATE OF DESCENT.

QUESTION: WELL, THAT'S ONE OF THE REASONS I HAVE ASKED THIS QUESTION ABOUT AT POSSIBILITY OF HYPOXIA. THAT IS, I UNDERSTAND, WITH POWER OFF, THAT THIS AIRCRAFT YOU HAVE TO HAVE A PRETTY STEEP NOSEDOWN TO MAINTAIN FLYING SPEED. WITH SOMETHING LIKE HYPOXIA YOU COULD HAVE PULLED THE POWER OFF, AND YET NOT REMEMBERING THAT, YET STILL HAVING ENOUGH CONSCIOUSNESS TO BE FLYING JUST THE ATTITUDE HORIZON, PERHAPS, AND THE THING COULD HAVE GONE RIGHT INTO A STALL, ABOUT THE WAY YOU DESCRIBED IT.

KEN: WELL, TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY THAT I CAN REMEMBER HERE, THE THROTTLES WERE FULL FORWARD AND I CAN ONLY GO OF COURSE ON THE WAY I FELT AT THE TIME, THAT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT I HAD HYPOXIA OR HYPERVENTILATION, OR EVEN VERTIGO. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT WOULD BE MORE OF A TENDENCY TO GET VERTIGO, IF SOMETHING WAS HAPPENING TO THE AIRCRAFT, AND THE INSTRUMENTS WERE NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. YOU GET THE FEELING OF NOT REALLY BEING RIGHT. AND I DIDN'T EXPERIENCE ANY OF THESE SYMPTOMS THAT I KNOW OF. AND HYPOXIA, I AM FAMILIAR ENOUGH WITH THAT, I BELIEVE, TO KNOW.

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QUESTION: YOU MENTIONED BEFORE THAT BECAUSE OF THE THROTTLE CREEP, YOU HAD THE THROTTLE FRICTION ON FULL, AND YOU HAD THIS JAMMED AS FAR AS IT WOULD GO.

KEN: THE THROTTLE CREEP IS NOT REALLY THE CREEP OF THE THROTTLE, AS MUCH AS IT IS THE RIGHT THROTTLE DID NOT STAY TO THE FULL FORWARD POSITION TO GET WATER. NOW, THIS I HAD NOT EXPERIENCED MYSELF. THE FIRST TIME I HAD USED THE WATER WAS ON THIS FLIGHT. SOMEONE MENTIONED THIS TO ME, I THINK IT WAS ONE OF THE OTHER PILOTS, AND THEY SAID TO MAKE SURE, IN FACT I THINK IT WAS [REDACTED] MAKE SURE YOU KEEP YOUR HANDS ON THE THROTTLES AND KEEP IT PUSHED UP BECAUSE EVEN WITH THE FRICTION FULL FORWARD, THE RIGHT ONE WILL COME BACK A BIT.

QUESTION: SO YOU HAD THE FRICTION FULL FORWARD?

KEN: I HAD THE FRICTION UP, OF COURSE I USE THE FRICTION ABOUT ALL THE TIME I'M IN THE AIRCRAFT ANYWAY.

QUESTION: IT WAS LEFT THIS WAY DURING THE FLIGHT?

KEN: YES.

QUESTION: KEN, A QUESTION ON CONTROLS. DID YOU EVER AT ANY TIME DURING THE WHOLE FLIGHT, PARTICULARLY DURING THIS TIME, NOTICE ANY STICK MOVEMENT INTRODUCED SOMEWHERE IN THE SYSTEM?

KEN: NO, I FELT NO ADVERSE STICK FORCES, OR AIRCRAFT FORCES, OR ANYTHING ON THE AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN THE STALL AND THE SHUDDER AND THE GYRATIONS.

[REDACTED] DURING YOUR ATTEMPTS TO RECOVER, AND MOVING YOUR CONTROLS AROUND, DID YOU EVER FEEL THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING WRONG CONTROL WISE, OR DID YOU FEEL THAT IT WAS RESPONDING?

KEN: WELL, I THINK IN THAT CONDITION THAT THE CONTROLS MAY NOT

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BE VERY EFFECTIVE, SO YOU CAN'T TELL. AS FAR AS THE MOVEMENT OF THE STICK, I THINK I CAN TRUTHFULLY SAY THAT I MOVED THE STICK TO VARIOUS CORNERS OF THE COCKPIT AND THAT THERE WAS NO BINDING FEEL IN THE STICK. I'M SURE THAT I DID NOT GO CLEAR FROM ONE STOP TO THE OTHER. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT I DID, UNLESS IT WAS FULL FORWARD. BUT THE STICK SEEMED TO HAVE ABOUT THE SAME STICK FORCE AS I RECALL.

QUESTION: YOU CAN'T REMEMBER ANY INDICATIONS OF POWER LOSS?

KEN: NO SIR. THIS IS AGAIN, A REPEAT, OF COURSE MOST OF THESE QUESTIONS ARE REPETITIVE. EVERYTHING FOR THE TWO HOUR FLIGHT HAD GONE NORMAL, THERE SEEMED TO BE NO MALFUNCTIONING OF THE INSTRUMENTS, AND I WAS JUST SURPRISED THAT THIS AIRSPEED INDICATOR WOULD START GOING UP IN A CLIMBING LEFT TURN. ALL OF A SUDDEN THE THING JUST SORT OF STARTED INCREASING TO THE POINT THAT IT DID.

AND AT THE TIME OF THE TURN, I DON'T KNOW HOW LONG IT TOOK, I WASN'T TIMING THAT, I WAS CHECKING THE AIRSPEED, BUT THIS THING WENT UP, AND I THOUGHT OF CALLING [REDACTED] ABOUT IT, BUT I THOUGHT, WELL, I GUESS HE TAKES CARE OF HIS AIRCRAFT, AND SO FORTH. THIS JUST PASSED THROUGH MY MIND AND HAVING VERY LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE HERE, AND THEN WHEN THE THING STARTED GOING DOWN, WHY, I WAS ABOUT READY TO LEVEL OFF SO I GUESS MY ATTENTION WAS DIVERTED TO THE ROLLING OUT AND THE LEVELING OFF AND STARTING OF THE INS AGAIN AND THE AUTO-NAV.

QUESTION: WELL, YOU SEE MY POINT IS THAT, FROM ALL OF THE THINGS WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING HERE, THE ONLY THING THAT FITS IN ALL THE FLIGHT ATTITUDES AND THE FACT THAT THE DIAGNOSIS THAT YOU WERE THINKING OF AT THE BEGINNING WHICH I THINK PROBABLY ALL OF US WOULD HAVE THOUGHT OF AT FIRST WHEN THE AIRSPEED STARTS GOING

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DOWN LIKE THAT, WAS THE PITOT FAILURE, OR INSTRUMENT FAILURE, OBVIOUSLY THIS WAS NOT WHAT HAPPENED, BECAUSE YOU ACTUALLY STALLED OUT AND WENT INTO A SPIN. SO, THEREFORE, FROM ALL OF THE OTHER INDICATIONS OF A FAIRLY LEVEL FLIGHT AND SO FORTH, YOU MUST HAVE HAD A POWER LOSS. THIS IS THE ONLY THING THAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED. YOU WOULD WONDER IF YOU HAVE A POWER LOSS THEN IF YOU DIDN'T, WHY WEREN'T THERE ANY OTHER INDICATIONS. YOU WERE SURE THAT YOU WERE STILL 98 PERCENT AND YOU SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABOUT 75 PERCENT IF YOU HAD GOTTEN A POWER LOSS, THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN OTHER DECELERATIONS.

25X1A KEN: YES.

COMING BACK TO THIS 1800 POUND FUEL FLOW, HE WOULD HAVE ALREADY HAD THE POWER LOSS.

ANSWER: YES, BUT THAT DOESN'T MATCH UP VERY WELL WITH 1.05 MACH NUMBER EITHER.

QUESTION: I WOULD LIKE TO ASK A QUESTION ABOUT THAT 1.05 MACH NUMBER, WERE YOU VFR AT THIS TIME?

KEN: WELL YES.

QUESTION: AND I WOULD LIKE TO ASK ANOTHER QUESTION OF GLENN OR ED. WHAT WOULD YOU EXPECT IN LEVEL FLIGHT VELOCITY IN FULL MILITARY POWER? IF WE TIE THIS DOWN TO VFR CONDITIONS WITH A KNOWN SOURCE OF ATTITUDE ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE AIRPLANE?

GLENN: STRAIGHT AND LEVEL IT WOULDN'T DO 1.05 MACH NUMBER. THIS IS FAR IN EXCESS OF ITS CAPABILITY.

25X1A YOU NORMALLY EXPECT PROBABLY ABOUT 315-320 KEAS MAX AT THESE ALTITUDES. THIS IS ROUGHLY WHAT NUMBER 4 DOES, 316-320

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AS I RECALL - FULL MAX. NOT AB.

IF THERE ARE NO MORE QUESTIONS WE WILL CUT THIS
OFF AT THIS TIME.

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END OF MESSAGE

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